JACQUES .DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

1/24/2022 1:38 PM

Facial Recognition Technology and
Privacy: Race and Gender – How to
Ensure the Right to Privacy is Protected

LINDSEY JACQUES*

TABLE OF CONTENTS
I.
II.

III.

IV.

INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................112
BACKGROUND..........................................................................................114
A. How Facial Recognition Technology Works..................................114
B. Accuracy of the Technology...........................................................116
C. The Expansion of its Use................................................................116
D. Beneficial Uses of the Technology .................................................118
BIAS AND PRIVACY IMPLICATIONS – RACE AND GENDER ..........................119
A. Bias in Facial Recognition Technology .........................................119
1. Racial Bias..............................................................................120
2. Gender Bias ............................................................................121
B. Privacy Implications ......................................................................122
C. Exacerbation of Privacy Concerns Caused by Bias.......................125
LEGAL BACKGROUND AND IMPLICATIONS OF FRT USE ............................127
A. Constitutional Privacy Law in Each of the Five Nations ...............128
1. China ......................................................................................128
2. France.....................................................................................128
3. Russian Federation .................................................................128
4. United Kingdom......................................................................129
5. United States...........................................................................129
B. United Nations International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights .......................................................................130
C. European Convention on Human Rights........................................132

*
© 2021 Lindsey Jacques. J.D. Candidate 2022, University of San Diego School
of Law. The author would like to thank Professor Laurence Claus, Raquel Zilberman
Rotman, Chandler Martin, and Joel Kaufmann for their input, guidance, and support.

111

JACQUES .DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

V.

VI.

VII.

1/24/2022 1:38 PM

D. European Union General Data Protection Regulation..................132
E. UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights ................132
FRT USE AND IMPLICATIONS IN EACH OF THE FIVE NATIONS ...................133
A. FRT Use in Each of the Five Nations.............................................133
1. China ......................................................................................133
2. France.....................................................................................136
3. Russian Federation .................................................................137
4. United Kingdom......................................................................138
5. United States...........................................................................139
B. Implications of FRT Use as National Security Leaders .................141
C. Constitutional Provisions...............................................................142
D. ICCPR and Privacy Implications of FRT.......................................143
E. European Convention on Human Rights........................................144
F. European Union GDPR .................................................................144
G. Company Self-Regulation Efforts and Third-Party
Standards .......................................................................................145
PROPOSED AND POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS ......................................................146
A. National FRT Regulation...............................................................147
1. Moratorium, Not a Ban...........................................................148
2. Regulatory Requirements........................................................149
B. International FRT Regulation........................................................151
C. The Role of Companies ..................................................................153
CONCLUSION ...........................................................................................154

I. INTRODUCTION
Technology has evolved to a point where science-fiction and dystopian
movies are no longer far stretches of the imagination. A phone or apartment
building can now be unlocked with just a scan of the face.1 Police can use
technology to monitor facial expressions within a crowd and determine
whether someone seems likely to commit a crime.2 Governments can track
a person’s movements using only images of the person’s eyes.3 Although

1. Simon Denyer, Beijing Bets on Facial Recognition in a Big Drive for Total
Surveillance, WASH. POST (Jan. 7, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/world/
wp/2018/01/07/feature/in-china-facial-recognition-is-sharp-end-of-a-drive-for-totalsurveillance/ [https://perma.cc/ T2UB-NSJU].
2. Jesse Damiani, New Research Reveals Facial Recognition Software Misclassifies
Transgender, Non-Binary People, FORBES (Oct. 29, 2019, 3:21 PM), https://www.forbes.
com/sites/jessedamiani/2019/10/29/new-research-reveals-facial-recognition-softwaremisclassifies-transgender-non-binary-people/?sh=2925520606b5 [https://perma.cc/97HZRJQ8].
3. Rachel Metz, Think Your Mask Makes You Invisible to Facial Recognition? Not
so Fast, AI Companies Say, CNN (Aug. 12, 2020, 8:14 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2020/
08/12/tech/face-recognition-masks/index.html [https://perma.cc/Y2MF-G7YS] [hereinafter
Metz, Think Your Mask].
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this technology may still sound like it came from a science-fiction movie,
the evolution of facial recognition technology makes all of this a reality
across the globe.4
Facial recognition technology (“FRT”) may sound scary, but it has the
potential to be very beneficial for national security, identifying criminals,
and mitigating threats of terrorism.5 However, the technology does not
come without issue, as the technology is often thought to violate privacy
and is biased against people of color, women, transgender individuals, and
people who do not present gender 6 on the typical male-female genderbinary.7 The technology is largely unregulated and has highly irregular
accuracy due to this racial and gender bias. The beneficial uses and issues
of FRT creates an ethical dilemma between the technology’s security
protections and privacy violations.
This Article specifically focuses on the use of FRT by the five permanent
members of the United Nations (“UN”) Security Council which are China,
France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, and the United States
(the five nations).8 As permanent members of the Security Council, these
five nations are tasked with maintaining international security under the
UN Charter.9
National leaders in these countries are forced to face the question of
whether the national security mitigating benefits of FRT outweigh the
privacy and equity concerns the technology imposes for populations often
considered the most vulnerable. This Article proposes solutions to this
ethical dilemma at a national and international level.
Section II walks through how FRT works, the accuracy of the technology,
how the technology has expanded and evolved, and the beneficial uses of
the technology. Section III discusses the bias of the technology and the

4. Facial Recognition Market, MKTS. & MKTS., https://www.marketsandmarkets.
com/Market-Reports/facial-recognition-market-995.html [https://perma.cc/U4D9-MT67].
5. See infra Section II.D.
6. Sex refers to the biological differences in anatomy between individuals. Gender
refers to socially constructed appearances, behaviors, and expressions of sex, typically based on
social norms and stereotypes. Sex and Gender, PLANNED PARENTHOOD, https://www.planned
parenthood.org/learn/gender-identity/sex-gender-identity [https://perma.cc/9LB9-JF4N].
7. Much of society operates on a gender binary, which classifies individuals as
one of two genders: male or female. This binary aligns with the social construct that people
with certain anatomy should present as “male,” and people with other anatomy should
present as “female.” Damiani, supra note 2.
8. U.N. Charter, art. 23, ¶ 1.
9. Id. at art. 24, ¶ 1.
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privacy implications of its use. Section IV then walks through the governing
law including the constitutional privacy rights, the International Convention
on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”), the European Convention on
Human Rights, the EU General Data Protection Regulation (“GDPR”),
and the Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights. Section V lays
out the use of FRT by each of the five nations, and the legal implications
of this FRT use. Section VI proposes solutions both at a national and
international level, and Section VII concludes the Article.
II. BACKGROUND
A. How Facial Recognition Technology Works
FRT is a form of biometric which is “a way to identify someone based
on physical characteristics: fingerprints, DNA, retinas, voice, [or] face.”10
The collected facial data is then considered biometric data.11 Facial recognition
technology works by detecting a face, analyzing or mapping out that face,
and finally recognizing the identity of the person behind the face.12 The
technology relies on machine learning and algorithms to detect, map, and
recognize faces.13
To train the technology, data consisting of large volumes of images of
faces is fed to artificial intelligence (“AI”) systems which trains the
algorithms to recognize patterns or physical traits of faces.14 To identify a
face, FRT analyzes distinctive features of a person’s face.15 Some FRT

10. Biometrics, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/issues/privacy-technology/surveillancetechnologies/biometrics [https://perma.cc/8WCV-TD4H].
11. Amnesty International Calls for Ban on the Facial Recognition Technology for
Mass Surveillance, AMNESTY INT’L (June 11, 2020, 6:00 PM), https://www.amnesty.org/
en/latest/research/2020/06/amnesty-international-calls-for-ban-on-the-use-of-facialrecognition-technology-for-mass-surveillance/ [https://perma.cc/8WCV-TD4H] [hereinafter
Amnesty International Calls for Ban].
12. Thorin Klosowski, Facial Recognition is Everywhere. Here’s What We Can Do
About It, N.Y. TIMES (July 15, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/wirecutter/blog/how-facialrecognition-works/ [https://perma.cc/N429-STZ5].
13. Id.
14. Paul Mozur, One Month, 500,000 Face Scans: How China Is Using A.I. to
Profile a Minority, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 14, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/14/
technology/china-surveillance-artificial-intelligence-racial-profiling.html [https://perma.cc/
2HAY-55JL].
15. Street-Level Surveillance, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND., https://www.eff.org/pages/
face-recognition#:~:text=Face%20recognition%20systems%20use%20computer,in%20a%20
face%20recognition%20database [https://perma.cc/KBJ3-ZXEM].
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analyzes physical features outside of just the face such as the clothing an
individual is wearing16 or the length of an individual’s hair.17
FRT allows a specific individual to be identified from a photo, video,
or live surveillance.18 FRT can be used for one-to-one identification in
which the technology identifies one individual against an image of one
individual.19 In one-to-one FRT use, the technology is ensuring a person is
who they say they are, often to gain entry or access. There is also one-tomany identification20 in which one individual is attempted to be matched
and identified amongst a database of many (sometimes billions)21 facial
images.
When FRT is involved in one-to-many use, there must be a database of
facial images to compare the image to. In practice, this form of FRT use
entails “widespread bulk monitoring, collection, storage, [and] analysis or
other use of material and collection of sensitive personal data . . . which
amounts to indiscriminate mass surveillance.”22 When FRT is deployed in
real time, a face can be spotted in a live crowd of people.23 When FRT is
implemented by governments or agencies, it is sometimes deployed using
hidden cameras and closed-circuit television (“CCTV”).24 It functions as
a form of surveillance because it does not require the consent or participation
of the individual being monitored.25

16. Morgan Klaus Scheuerman et al., How Computers See Gender: An Evaluation
of Gender Classification in Commercial Facial Analysis and Image Labeling Services, 3
Proc. ACM Hum.-Comput. Interact., Vol. 3, No. CSCW, Art. 144 (Nov. 2019).
17. Short Wave, Why Tech Companies are Limiting Police Use of Facial Recognition,
NPR, at 9:55 (Feb. 18, 2021), https://www.npr.org/2021/02/17/968710172/why-techcompanies-are-limiting-police-use-of-facial-recognition [https://perma.cc/5PV2-S29N].
18. Klosowski, supra note 12.
19. An example of this is unlocking a phone or apartment with your facial image.
In one-to-one identification, the technology is essentially ensuring it is you. Short Wave,
supra note 17, at 0:50.
20. Id. at 1:43.
21. Kashmir Hill, The Secretive Company that Might End Privacy as We Know It,
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 18, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/18/technology/clearviewprivacy-facial-recognition.html [https://perma.cc/F73C-NXYG] [hereinafter Hill, The Secretive
Company].
22. Amnesty International Calls for Ban, supra note 11.
23. Mozur, supra note 14.
24. Damiani, supra note 2.
25. Face Recognition Technology, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/issues/privacytechnology/surveillance-technologies/face-recognition-technology [https://perma.cc/SHA8NPBN] [hereinafter ACLU Facial Recognition Technology].
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B. Accuracy of the Technology
Many companies selling the technology rely on a different algorithm
with a distinct level of accuracy.26 The accuracy of the technology is
impacted by many factors including the specific algorithm used, the diversity
of images used to train the algorithm, 27 and the physical conditions in
which the FRT is deployed.28 There is no international accuracy standard
for FRT, and no nation has national accuracy standards for FRT.29
Third-party independent organizations have conducted studies of global
accuracy on FRT to try to determine how accurate the technology really
is.30 The inaccuracies across the various algorithms ranged from insubstantial
to high levels inaccuracy.31 These studies also found that most algorithms
have some level of demographic differential, with false positives more
frequent than false negatives.32 A false positive means the FRT incorrectly
considered two different individuals the same person. 33 Conversely, a
false negative means the FRT did not match a person even though there
was a match to be made.34 A false negative may result in incorrect exclusion,
but a false positive can lead to an incorrect inclusion of an individual.35
C. The Expansion of its Use
The use of FRT has become mainstream in recent years.36 Some
individuals were first introduced to FRT through Apple’s Face ID which

26. Tom Simonite, Why Chinese Companies Plug a US Test for Facial Recognition,
WIRED (Mar. 6, 2020, 7:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/china-earns-high-marksus-test-facial-recognition/ [https://perma.cc/PLQ5-GS9V].
27. Klosowski, supra note 12.
28. William Crumpler, How Accurate are Facial Recognition Systems – and Why
Does It Matter?, CSIS (Apr. 14, 2020), https://www.csis.org/blogs/technology-policyblog/how-accurate-are-facial-recognition-systems-%E2%80%93-and-why-does-it-matter
[https://perma.cc/PSD4-JTB3].
29. See infra Section II.A.
30. U.S. DEP’T OF COM., NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY,
NISTIR 8280, FACE RECOGNITION VENDOR TEST (FRVT) PART 3: DEMOGRAPHIC EFFECTS
(2019).
31. NIST Study Evaluates Effects of Race, Age, Sex on Face Recognition Software,
NIST (Dec. 19, 2019), https://www.nist.gov/news-events/news/2019/12/nist-study-evaluateseffects-race-age-sex-face-recognition-software [https://perma.cc/38LJ-QGWM] [hereinafter
NIST Study].
32. U.S. DEP’T OF COM., NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY,
supra note 30.
33. NIST Study, supra note 31.
34. NIST Study, supra note 31.
35. NIST Study, supra note 31.
36. Klosowski, supra note 12.
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allows iPhone users to unlock their device with a scan of the face.37 The
same technology has since found uses ranging from replacing keys for
home access to protecting Taylor Swift from stalkers.38 The prevalence of
FRT is increasing as the technology improves and becomes normalized.39
FRT is growing worldwide both in governmental and commercial use.40
The technology continues to quickly evolve, pushing the boundaries of its
capabilities and the possible uses of the tech. Recently, the technology has
been used to predict emotional states41 such as fear on an individual’s face.42
With this development, agencies can use the technology to determine if
someone seems mad or angry enough to commit a crime and can preemptively
stop the potential crime.43 During the Coronavirus pandemic, companies
quickly developed their FRT to ensure their technology could still recognize
faces even with masks on, an item long used to avoid FRT.44 To do so,
some FRT companies developed their technology to identify individuals
using only an image of the eyes.45
The way in which FRT has been used and implemented across the globe
differs.46 In a few nations the technology is restricted, but in the majority
of nations across the globe it is freely used or its use is at least being

37. This technology utilizes one-to-one use of FRT in which the FRT compares the
face of the person attempting to unlock the phone, and the image of the face stored in the
phone. Klosowski, supra note 12.
38. Klosowski, supra note 12.
39. See Klosowski, supra note 12.
40. Sintia Radu, The Technology That’s Turning Heads, US NEWS (July 26, 2019,
4:38 PM), https://www.usnews.com/news/best-countries/articles/2019-07-26/growingnumber-of-countries-employing-facial-recognition-technology.
41. Damiani, supra note 2.
42. Ryan Browne, Tech Giants Want Rules on Facial Recognition, but Critics Warn
that Won’t be Enough, CNBC (Aug. 30, 1:26 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/08/30/
facial-recognition-tech-firms-want-regulation-but-critics-want-a-ban.html [https://perma.cc/
5793-SBHF].
43. Oscar Schwartz, Don’t Look Now: Why You Should be Worried About Machines
Reading Your Emotions, THE GUARDIAN (Mar. 6, 2019), https://www.theguardian.com/
technology/2019/mar/06/facial-recognition-software-emotional-science [https://perma.cc/
JNF4-9M6M].
44. Alfred Ng, Facial Recognition Firms are Scrambling to See Around Face
Masks, CNET (May 15, 2020, 5:00 AM), https://www.cnet.com/health/facial-recognitionfirms-are-scrambling-to-see-around-face-masks/ [https://perma.cc/56QR-RTWG].
45. Metz, Think Your Mask, supra note 3.
46. See Iman Ghosh, Mapped: The State of Facial Recognition Around the World,
VISUAL CAPITALIST (May 22, 2020), https://www.visualcapitalist.com/facial-recognitionworld-map/ [https://perma.cc/L9K6-ZZMU].
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considered by governments, industry, or both.47 Some FRT is sold within
the borders of the nation it was developed in, but some FRT is sold
internationally.48 One example of international FRT sales is the American
company Clearview AI which has sold its FRT technology to national law
enforcement agencies, government bodies, and police forces in twenty-six
countries.49
D. Beneficial Uses of the Technology
There are several beneficial uses of facial recognition technology. In
one-to-one use, FRT can increase convenience and security.50 For example,
the technology has been implemented at apartment buildings which
allows an individual to enter their51 apartment building without a key just
by scanning their face at the entrance.52 The technology can also be fun
for individuals to use and provides a positive user experience by allowing
iPhone users to forgo a passcode, for example.53 However, the real benefit
of this technology is the security it can provide.
In one-to-one use, FRT likely provides minimal actual security protection,
but in one-to-many use, the technology can be very beneficial in protecting
national security. 54 The technology can be used to solve cases, identify
victims,55 identify perpetrators,56 monitor known criminals, find suspects
at large events, increase national security at borders or airports,57 and find

47. Klosowski, supra note 12.
48. Sam Shead, Facial Recognition Tech Developed by Clearview AI Could be Illegal
in Europe, Privacy Group Says, CNBC (June 11, 2020, 11:42 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/
2020/06/11/clearview-ai-facial-recognition-europe.html [https://perma.cc/W3UK-CUBQ]
[hereinafter Shead, Facial Recognition Tech].
49. The 17 nations Clearview AI is selling its FRT to include Belgium, Denmark,
Finland, France, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal,
Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. Id.
50. Klosowski, supra note 12.
51. To ensure representation and inclusivity, this discussion will use the terms
“their,” “themselves,” and “they” instead of “his or her” as grammar fails to include genders
outside of the male-female binary just like facial recognition technology.
52. Denyer, supra note 1.
53. Klosowski, supra note 12.
54. Klosowski, supra note 12.
55. Short Wave, supra note 17, at 2:01.
56. Hill, The Secretive Company, supra note 21; see, e.g., Kashmir Hill, The FacialRecognition App Clearview Sees a Spike in Use After Capitol Attack, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 9,
2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/09/technology/facial-recognition-clearviewcapitol.html [https://perma.cc/F6HQ-M2RU] [hereinafter Hill, The Facial-Recognition
App] (FRT was used to identify perpetrators of the January 6, 2021 Trump supporting
white nationalist attack on the U.S. capitol).
57. Klosowski, supra note 12.
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people who have gone missing.58 The technology has been used to reunite
lost individuals who have Alzheimer’s disease with their family, locate
child rapists on the run, and help identify potential witnesses.59 It has also
proven to be useful when an individual is attempting to evade police
detection, such as the case of a man who bit off his finger prints to avoid
being identified by police.60
Although the technology is rarely used alone in this capacity and typically
has a human overseer,61 the technology does what a police agency cannot—
it provides an ever-present eagle eye watching for wrongdoers. The wrongs
the technology prevents differs broadly, ranging from ensuring individuals
with COVID-19 are following quarantine orders,62 to identifying individuals
who attacked the U.S. capitol on January 6th, 2021.63
The technology is only growing in its use and capabilities, so the security
and protection measures the technology provides will likely continue to grow
as well. The beneficial uses of the technology will also likely increase if and
when the technology becomes less biased and more accurate.
III. BIAS AND PRIVACY IMPLICATIONS – RACE AND GENDER
While FRT may be the cutting edge of policing and national security,
the benefits of the technology do not come without flaw resulting in intrusive
and potentially life-threatening bias and privacy violations.
A. Bias in Facial Recognition Technology
Facial recognition technology has major problems with bias, specifically
regarding race and gender.64 Because of these biases, the technology fails

58. Delhi: Facial Recognition System Helps Trace 3,000 Missing Children in 4
Days, TIMES OF INDIA (Apr. 22, 2018, 7:23), https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/
delhi/delhi-facial-recognition-system-helps-trace-3000-missing-children-in-4-days/article
show/63870129.cms [https://perma.cc/LMM4-6T6E].
59. Jennifer Valentino-DeVries, How the Police Use Facial Recognition, and Where it
Falls Short, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 12, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/12/technology/
facial-recognition-police.html [https://perma.cc/TU46-LKRB].
60. Id.
61. Short Wave, supra note 17, at 11:42.
62. See, e.g., Mary Ilyushina, How Russia is Using Authoritarian Tech to Curb
Coronavirus, CNN (Mar. 29, 2020, 12:01 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2020/03/29/europe/
russia-coronavirus-authoritarian-tech-intl/index.html [https://perma.cc/S2QN-QJ54].
63. Hill, The Facial-Recognition App, supra note 56.
64. Short Wave, supra note 17, at 2:15.
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to accurately identify people of color, women,65 and people who don’t
present gender on the stereotypical male-female gender binary.66
Bias creeps into FRT algorithms beginning with the data fed into the
technology. 67 The technology creates a statistical model of what a face
should look like based on the images that were fed to it during training;
“the machine is only as smart as its training data.”68 Research has found
that common data sets used by FRT companies are “overwhelmingly pale
and male,” with data being comprised of up to eighty-six percent white
individuals.69 When the technology does not learn what a black or brown
face looks like, it will have a bias or preference towards white faces
because it views the white face as “correct.” While the exact level of bias
depends on the specific algorithm used,70 the evidence of bias raises the
ethical quandary of any FRT use.
1. Racial Bias
Overall, FRT is not good at identifying people of color.71 Research has
shown that the technology is more effective on lighter skinned faces than
darker skinned faces.72 The issue of racial bias is one of a failure to identify
individuals accurately more often when they have a greater pigmentation to
their skin.
This racial bias could possibly be improved with greater racial diversity
in the algorithmic data. FRT tends to be able to identify Asian and Caucasian
people with a higher accuracy when the technology is developed in an Asian
country.73 It appears that racial inaccuracy of the technology decreases
when the algorithm is trained using more images of that particular race.

65. Id. at 5:58.
66. Damiani, supra note 2.
67. Short Wave, supra note 17, at 6:33.
68. Short Wave, supra note 17, at 7:37.
69. Short Wave, supra note 17, at 7:37.
70. Facial Recognition Technology (FRT), NIST (Feb. 6, 2020), https://www.
nist.gov/speech-testimony/facial-recognition-technology-frt-0 [https://perma.cc/A9SMPVZN] [hereinafter NIST on FRT].
71. Jeffery N. Rosenthal & Huaou Yan, Coming Face-to-Face With Facial Recognition
Technology, THE LEGAL INTELLIGENCER (July 29, 2019), https://plus.lexis.com/document/
?pdmfid=1530671&crid=f853a061-d3e7-4e7a-98d9-1354def8d3d6&pddocfullpath=%2F
shared%2Fdocument%2Flegalnews%2Furn%3AcontentItem%3A5WP7-W6F1-JBM3R1J4-00000-00&pdcontentcomponentid=12324&pdworkfolderlocatorid=NOT_SAVED_IN_
WORKFOLDER&prid=59e5ef7c-0330-429d-8c79-58f272997ec1&ecomp=pt4k&earg=
sr1&cbc=0 [https://perma.cc/NR6D-942L].
72. Short Wave, supra note 17, at 2:15.
73. NIST Study, supra note 31.
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2. Gender Bias
FRT also has a gender bias. 74 There are two kinds of gender bias in
FRT. First, gender bias exists because the technology typically functions
on a gender binary,75 so it is inherently prejudicial against gender presentations
outside the binary. Self-identified gender labels, such as non-binary,76
agender,77 or genderqueer78 are universally not able to be classified by
FRT.79 Although these individuals may not be misidentified at higher rates
than male or female identified genders, the technology cannot identify
their identified gender whatsoever.80 By only classifying gender as male
or female,81 the technology perpetuates the idea that gender is binary.
Gender is a social construct of the presentation of anatomical sex,82 so the
notion that one must be either “male” or “female” presenting is clearly
erroneous and antiquated.
The second form of gender bias, like the racial bias of FRT, exists when
the technology fails to identify female gender presenting individuals with
the same accuracy as male presenting individuals.83 Similarly, the technology
misidentifies transgender people and individuals not presenting gender on
the male-female binary at higher rates than those who are not transgender
and those who present gender based on the male-female binary.84

74. Short Wave, supra note 17, at 2:15.
75. Scheuerman et al., supra note 16.
76. Non-binary is the term used by individuals to refer to gender when they do not
fit within the male-female gender binary. Nonbinary, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.
merriam-webster.com/dictionary/nonbinary [https://perma.cc/7DUC-JZJD].
77. Agender refers to the gender of an individual who does not identify as any
particular gender. Agender, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/
agender [https://perma.cc/EN3J-T4DW].
78. Genderqueer is a term used to refer to gender when an individual does not fit
within the male-female binary. Genderqueer, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/genderqueer [https://perma.cc/L2LG-RET4].
79. This study showed that the technology correctly identified cisgender women
98.3 percent of the time and cisgender men 97.6 percent of the time, but only identified
include genders outside of the male-female binary as well. transgender women correctly
87.3 percent of the time and transgender men only 70.5 percent of the time. Scheuerman
et al., supra note 16.
80. Scheuerman et al., supra note 16.
81. Scheuerman et al., supra note 16.
82. Gender and Health, WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION [WHO], https://www.who.int/
health-topics/gender#tab=tab_1 [https://perma.cc/4MVN-95P4].
83. NIST on FRT, supra note 70.
84. Scheuerman et al., supra note 16.
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FRT is limited by the premise that gender can be classified by outward
appearance.85 For example, researchers have found correlations between
short hair and how FRT classifies an individual’s gender.86 This has led
Black women with afros to be misgendered 87 and thus misidentified at
higher rates than white women.88 Some algorithms even include traditionally
gendered features like beards or mustaches or traditionally gendered clothing
in gender identification.89 The technology’s gender bias impacts transgender
and non-binary individuals, and anyone who does not present gender in a
stereotypical gender normative90 way.
Gender classification has been found to be inconsistent across FRT
companies due to variances in algorithms.91 Some technology relies more
heavily on gender stereotypes than others, as individuals who wear makeup
and dress as a stereotypically presenting female have been classified as
both male and female depending on the algorithm.92
B. Privacy Implications
The widespread response to FRT implementation and use across the
globe has been that the technology is invasive and goes too far.93 This reaction
shows that individuals, regardless of where they reside, hold an expectation
of privacy that seems to be violated by the use of FRT.
Privacy is a basic expectation most individuals hold to some degree; it
allows individuals to create boundaries for protection from arbitrary
intrusion into the intimacies of life.94 The ACLU defines privacy as, “a
concept central to our identities, our ability to control information and our
senses of self, and our interactions with other individuals and communities.”95

85. Scheuerman et al., supra note 16.
86. Short Wave, supra note 17, at 9:48.
87. Short Wave, supra note 17, at 9:48.
88. NIST Study, supra note 31.
89. Scheuerman et al., supra note 16.
90. Gender normative means adhering to ideal or typical standards of femininity or
masculinity. Gender Normative, MERRIAM WEBSTER, https://www.merriamwebster.com/
dictionary/gender%20normative [https://perma.cc/JNX7-R9D2].
91. Scheuerman et al., supra note 16.
92. Scheuerman et al., supra note 16.
93. See infra Section V.A.
94. The Right to Privacy and Why it Matters, EACH OTHER (July 23, 2015), https://
eachother.org.uk/the-right-to-privacy-and-why-it-matters/ [https://perma.cc/FJW6-RPZS].
95. Privacy Rights in the Digital Age: A Proposal for a New General Comment on
the Right to Privacy under Article 17 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, ACLU (Mar. 2014), https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/assets/jus14-reporticcpr-web-rel1.pdf [hereinafter Privacy Rights in the Digital Age].
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Privacy is a basic human right and is recognized as such by the United
Nations in international human rights law such as the ICCPR. 96 Despite
being a basic human right, there is no clear definition of the term “privacy”
in international law.97 The Secretary-General of the UN has observed:
[T]he very existence of an internationally recognized right to privacy presupposes
agreement that there are certain areas of the individual’s life that are outside the
concern of either governmental authorities or the general public, areas which may
vary in size from country to country, but which do possess a common central
core.98

The general reaction to FRT shows that its use may pry into the part of an
individual’s life that should exist outside of governmental concern.
The technology is evolving faster than privacy law can keep pace with,
and “recent [technological] developments have called into question the
extent to which traditional understandings of privacy remain[s] viable in
modern times.”99 When fundamental human rights laws, such as the ICCPR,
were enacted, the technological capabilities of the twenty-first century
were unimaginable and were thus not considered when writing the law.100
FRT creates a “quantum shift” in the way individuals think about privacy.101
The technology invites a question of whether the idea of anonymity102
plays a role in the modern version of privacy, and if it does, whether FRT
violates this right. While it is not expected that a face will be private while
in a public setting, one does not expect greater scrutiny and analysis of the
facial image for unknown and potentially unethical reasons. It is expected
that in a public space, others see us as much as we see them, not more than
we see them. It is not expected that someone in public can identify the
name and details of an individual they do not know personally. The thought
of someone not immediately in the vicinity watching and analyzing faces
through FRT creates the same uncomfortable feeling of someone watching
public actions through binoculars. This greater scrutiny and complete lack
of anonymity feels to many like a total invasion of privacy.
96. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature Dec.
19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR].
97. See Jonathan Turley, Anonymity, Obscurity, and Technology: Reconsidering Privacy
in the Age of Biometrics, 100 B.U.L. REV. 2179, 2220 (2020).
98. Myres Smith McDougal, et al., HUMAN RIGHTS AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER:
THE BASIC POLICIES OF AN INTERNATIONAL LAW OF HUMAN DIGNITY 842 (2nd ed. 2019).
99. Privacy Rights in the Digital Age, supra note 95.
100. Privacy Rights in the Digital Age, supra note 95.
101. Turley, supra note 97.
102. Turley, supra note 97.
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When one is aware others are watching, they make act differently.
Accordingly, the technology “implicates the loss of freedom to move and
interact in public spaces without fear of being recognized or tracked. [FRT]
impacts the ability of individuals to freely form new experiences, associations,
and viewpoints.”103 If the use of FRT is known, people may not protest,
speak freely, or pray in public for fear of being identified and punished
for their actions.
However, non-disclosure of FRT use creates an issue of consent. The
use of FRT does not require the knowledge or consent of the person subject
to the technology.104 The technology analyzes the face so if the FRT is not
disclosed when used, it is nearly impossible to evade if an individual enters
into a space where FRT has been implemented.105
To train the algorithms, companies rely on large databases of facial images106
which are taken—often without consent of the subject of the image—from
various locations including websites, social media, dating services, and
cameras in restaurants or college campuses.107 Many FRT algorithms are
proprietary and are thus not publicly disclosed,108 so it is not always clear
for each FRT company how many photos are in the database or where the
photos came from. The number of photos in each database is likely very
large—potentially in the billions; it has been found that Clearview AI has
a database of three billion images taken from various websites including
Facebook, YouTube, and Venmo.109 While some of these facial datasets
are kept private, others are shared both nationally and internationally with
governments and companies.110
When one does not know their biometric data is being used, there is no
way of knowing if one’s biometric data has been stolen. Biometric data
can and has been stolen,111 but unlike the way passwords and usernames
can be reset after a breach, the face cannot be reset. Once the breach happens,
103. Turley, supra note 97.
104. ACLU Facial Recognition Technology, supra note 25.
105. One cannot avoid surveillance cameras if they do not know if and where it has
been implemented.
106. Browne, supra note 42.
107. Cade Metz, Facial Recognition Tech is Growing Stronger, Thanks to Your Face,
N.Y. TIMES (July 13, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/13/technology/databasesfaces-facial-recognition-technology.html [https://perma.cc/MYS3-DW2B] [hereinafter
Metz, Growing Stronger].
108. U.S. G OV ’ T ACCOUNTABILITY O FF ., GAO-20-522, F ACIAL R ECOGNITION
TECHNOLOGY: PRIVACY AND ACCURACY ISSUES RELATED TO COMMERCIAL USES (2020).
109. Hill, The Secretive Company, supra note 21.
110. Metz, Growing Stronger, supra note 107.
111. Josh Taylor, Major Breach Found in Biometrics System Used by Banks, UK
Police and Defence Firms, THE GUARDIAN (Aug. 14, 2019), https://www.theguardian.com/
technology/2019/aug/14/major-breach-found-in-biometrics-system-used-by-banks-ukpolice-and-defence-firms [https://perma.cc/G38H-QYGF].
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the individual in the image is vulnerable to have their image used for
sinister purposes; for example, for purposes that may send them to jail, to
an encampment, or to a war-stricken country. The individual in the image
may not have even known they were being subjected to FRT in the first
place, but improper security of their facial data could cause them to suffer
life-altering consequences.
The issue of privacy in FRT use has been exacerbated and accelerated
by the global Coronavirus pandemic beginning in 2020.112 As the Coronavirus
spread across the globe, countries raced to track the spread of the virus.113
Some countries used FRT to track contagious individuals and monitor the
spread of disease,114 but this opened the door to a new pandemic—intrusive
and problematic surveillance through FRT.
C. Exacerbation of Privacy Concerns Caused by Bias
People of all races, genders, and national origins are subject to privacy
concerns surrounding FRT, but these privacy issues are exacerbated for
people of color and individuals not presenting gender on the binary. As
the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination’s Verene
Shepherd stated, “[b]ig data and AI tools may reproduce and reinforce
already existing biases and lead to even more discriminatory practices.”115
The committee also pointed out that FRT use by policing agencies “risks
deepening racism, racial discrimination, . . . and consequently the violation
of many human rights” due to the technology’s bias.116 It should be noted
that although the committee did not mention the technology’s gender
discrimination, LGBT+117 individuals have historically faced discrimination
across the globe and are similarly impacted by the technology.118
112. Ng, supra note 44.
113. Ilyushina, supra note 62.
114. Ilyushina, supra note 62.
115. UN Committee Issues Recommendations to Combat Racial Profiling, OHCR
(Nov. 26, 2020), https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?News
ID=26548&LangID=E [https://perma.cc/RV5N-NAEZ].
116. Id.
117. LGBT+ stands for Lesbian, Gay, Bi-sexual, Transgender. The plus typically
includes individuals who do not represent gender on the male-female gender binary. See
Kendra Cherry, What Does LGBTQ+ Mean, VERYWELLMIND (Nov. 30, 2020), https://
www.verywellmind.com/what-does-lgbtq-mean-5069804 [https://perma.cc/9AQH-85W].
118. See Police Violence Around the World, AMNESTY INT’L, https://www.amnesty
usa.org/issues/deadly-force-police-accountability-police-violence/ [https://perma.cc/
A4SS-52YY] [hereinafter Police Violence]; see also Margaret Goff, Five Reasons Mass
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In an age of increasing gender diversity, identification technology that
functions on a gender binary is not accurate and has the potential to reinforce
gender stereotypes and may cause exclusion, unequal access, and
discrimination.119 The ramifications of this technology’s use of gender
normative characteristics for identifying sex can reinforce harmful gender
stereotypes.120 For example, one of China’s FRT uses includes monitoring
restroom entrances.121 Individuals are granted entry if the FRT identifies
the individual as the gender the restroom is designated to serve—male or
female.122 For those not presenting gender on the typical binary, this sort
of gender classification required for entry has the potential to obstruct
access completely. Gender classification based on physical appearance is
inherently discriminatory.
The technology discriminates in large part because of the false positives
the bias causes. The algorithmic bias is less accurate and thus results in
more false positives for people of color and non-binary gender presenting
individuals.123 The United States’ National Institute of Technology and
Standards (“NIST”) conducted research relating to bias in FRT, and found
that in one-to-one matching, some algorithms produced 100 times more
false positives with African and Asian faces compared to Eastern European
faces.124 While existing research largely focuses on one-to-one FRT matching,
NIST has found that similar demographic disparities also exist in some
one-to-many FRT—but it all depends on the algorithm.125 This disproportionate
impact of FRT use can lead to detrimental effects for already marginalized
communities.126
When FRT is used for security purposes, an increased number of false
positives for a certain demographic will likely result in more government
interventions and interactions for individuals of that particular demographic.
When used for policing, more false positives can lead to more interactions

Incarceration is a Queer Issue, URB . WIRE: C RIME & J UST . (Oct. 24, 2017), https://
www.urban.org/urban-wire/five-reasons-mass-incarceration-queer-issue [https://perma.cc/
25CF-YGNX].
119. Damiani, supra note 2.
120. Scheuerman et al., supra note 16.
121. Denyer, supra note 1.
122. Denyer, supra note 1.
123. NIST Study, supra note 31.
124. NIST on FRT, supra note 70.
125. NIST on FRT, supra note 70.
126. Short Wave, supra note 17, at 6:27.
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between racially, ethnically, 127 and gender identity prejudiced 128 police
agencies and people of color, transgender individuals, and non-binary
individuals. When minor infractions lead to arrest and prosecution, inaccuracies
in FRT could result in increased rates of arrest and prosecution for these
groups of people.129 These results will perpetuate already existing oppression
of people of color, non-binary, and transgender individuals.
Even if the FRT algorithm bias in a specific algorithm is minimal, FRT
can create additional problems depending on who is using the technology
and for what purpose. If the technology is in the hands of an individual or
agency that engages in discriminatory or prejudicial profiling, the technology
can be used to promote oppression. For example, in China government
officials sorted people by religious affiliation—solely relying on stereotypical
facial characteristics of people in that religion—and placed certain individuals
in camps based on this categorization.130 Similarly, in the U.S. the technology
has been used by police agencies which recently drew global backlash due
to the systematic racial prejudice in the American policing system.131
IV. LEGAL BACKGROUND AND IMPLICATIONS OF FRT USE
There are several laws and guiding principles related to privacy that govern
each of the permanent National Security Council members including national
127. Racial and ethnic bias in policing and/or government authority has been seen in
China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Sarah Cahlan & Joyce
Sohyun Lee, Video Evidence of Anti-Black Discrimination in China Over Coronavirus
Fears, WASH. POST (June 18, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/06/18/
video-evidence-anti-black-discrimination-china-over-coronavirus-fears/?arc404=true
[https://perma.cc/4HZU-YHQ7]; Bénédicte Jeannerod & Judith Sunderland, Time to Stop
Ethnic Profiling in France, HUM . R TS. WATCH (Jan. 28, 2021, 12:00 AM), https://
www.hrw.org/news/2021/01/28/time-stop-ethnic-profiling-france [https://perma.cc/RG3E293V]; MIRNA ADJAMI, ETHNIC PROFILING IN THE MOSCOW METRO 9 (David Berry, James
A. Goldston & Anita Soboleva eds. 2006); Anthony Cuthbertson, Eleven Charts that Show
Extent of Racial Inequality in the UK, THE INDEP. (June 18, 2020, 3:28 PM), https://www.
independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/racism-uk-inequality-black-lives-matter-wealtheconomic-health-a9567461.html [https://perma.cc/9PQZ-HXME]; Police Violence, supra
note 118.
128. Police Violence, supra note 118.
129. Nina Larson, UN Urges ‘Moratorium’ on Facial Recognition Tech Use in Protests,
BARRON’S (June 25, 2020), https://www.barrons.com/news/un-urges-moratorium-onfacial-recognition-tech-use-in-protests-01593091505 [https://perma.cc/8S2J-4KCG].
130. Mozur, supra note 14.
131. Kade Crockford, How is Face Recognition Surveillance Technology Racist,
ACLU (June 16, 2020), https://www.aclu.org/news/privacy-technology/how-is-face-recognitionsurveillance-technology-racist/ [https://perma.cc/HA6B-B7RU].
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constitutions, the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights,
the EU General Data Protection Regulation, the European Convention on
Human Rights, and the Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights.
A. Constitutional Privacy Rights in Each of the Five Nations
The permanent members of the UN’s Security Council have varying
levels of constitutional privacy protections. Additionally, the constitutions
that do provide some form of privacy protections do not clearly define
“privacy,” related terms, or the expanse of the protection.
It should be noted that although China and Russia technically have
independent court systems, they do not operate as such.132 This lack of
functional independence renders the constitutional privacy provisions of
each nation less binding because the judiciary is not required to abide by
the constitution, but rather the outside forces controlling it.
1. China
The Chinese Constitution lists as a fundamental right, “[f]reedom and
privacy of correspondence of citizens.”133 Infringing on this right by an
organization or individual is not allowed, except where it is needed “to
meet the needs of State security or of criminal investigation, [or] public
security.”134
2. France
France has no constitutional provisions specifically granting a right to
privacy.135
3. Russian Federation
Russia’s Constitution provides that, “[e]veryone shall have the right to
the inviolability of his (her) private life, personal and family privacy, and
protection of his (her) honour and good name.” 136 Additionally, the

132. Russian Federation: Independence and Impartiality; Judicial Integrity and
Accountability, INT’L COMM’N OF JURISTS (June 16, 2014), https://www.icj.org/cijlcountry
profiles/russian-federation/russian-federation-judges/russian-federation-independenceand-impartiality-judicial-integrity-and-accountability-2/ [https://perma.cc/KW4U-8ADN]
[hereinafter Russian Federation]; HE WEIFANG, ET AL., IN THE NAME OF JUSTICE: STRIVING
FOR THE RULE OF LAW IN CHINA 35 (2012) [hereinafter IN THE NAME OF JUSTICE].
133. XIANFA, art. 40, (1982).
134. Id.
135. 1958 CONST. (Fr.).
136. KONSTITUTSIIA ROSSIĪSKOĪ FEDERATSII [KONST. RF] [CONSTITUTION] art. 23 (Russ.).
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Constitution includes specific rights as to digital privacy stating “[e]veryone
shall have the right to privacy of correspondence, of telephone conversations
and of postal, telegraph and other communications. This right may be
limited only on the basis of a court order.”137
The Russian Federation’s Constitution must again be qualified. Russia
has a history of disregarding its constitutional protections, as the 1936
Constitution offered Russian citizens similar protections that were blatantly
disregarded by the Stalin regime.138
4. United Kingdom
The United Kingdom differs from the other countries in this analysis as
it does not have one codified constitution like the others. However, the
Human Rights Act of 1988 and the European Convention on Human Rights,
two constitutional documents of the nation, have been relied upon to
establish a general right to privacy for citizens.139
5. United States
The United States Constitution does not explicitly grant the American
people privacy rights, but the Supreme Court of the United States found
the right to privacy implicit in the Bill of Rights, specifically through the
First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments of the United States
Constitution.140
The Supreme court has also warned of the chilling effect government
action may have on individual freedoms, such as “the freedom of expression,
by making the individual more reluctant to exercise [that right].” 141

137. Id.
138. J. Arch Getty, State and Society Under Stalin: Constitutions and Elections in
the 1930s, 50 SLAVIC REV. 18, 18 (1991).
139. Robert Walker, The English Law of Privacy – An Evolving Human Right,
THE SUP. CT. https://www.supremecourt.uk/docs/speech_100825.pdf [https://perma.cc/
RH8L-JTTP].
140. The First Amendment provides for the freedom of speech, religion, assembly,
press and petition, the Third Amendments guarantees against the quartering of soldiers
without consent, the Fourth Amendment protects from unreasonable searches and seizures,
the Fifth amendment protects against self-incrimination, and the Ninth Amendment
provides the enumeration clause stating the listing of rights in the constitution does not
mean other rights do not exist. U.S. Const. amends. I, III, IV, V, IX; Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965).
141. See, e.g., Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 151 (1959).
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Although privacy as to a picture or image of one’s face is generally not
protected by the U.S. Constitution,142 FRT creeps into the territory of mass
surveillance which leads to the above-mentioned chilling of individual
expression.143
B. United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights is a United
Nations international human rights treaty. 144 It provides a range of
protections for civil and political rights including provisions regarding a
right to privacy.145 The ICCPR is considered to be part of the International
Bill of Human Rights.146
Article 17 of the ICCPR states that “[n]o one shall be subjected to arbitrary
or unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence,
nor to unlawful attacks on his honour and reputation.”147 Comment 16
provides more, but not binding, clarification regarding privacy in Article
17 from the UN Human Rights Committee:
The gathering and holding of personal information on computers . . . whether by
public authorities or private individuals or bodies, must be regulated by law.
Effective measures have to be taken by States to ensure that information concerning a
person’s private life does not reach the hands of persons who are not authorized
by law to receive, process and use it, and is never used for purposes incompatible
with the Covenant. In order to have the most effective protection of his private
life, every individual should have the right to ascertain in an intelligible form,
whether, and if so, what personal data is stored in automatic data files, and for

142. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
143. It has long been held that individuals act differently when they know they are
being watched. See, e.g., Spencer EA & Mahtani K, Hawthorne Effect. When Individuals
Modify an Aspect of their Behaviour in Response to their Awareness of Being Observed,
SACKETT CATALOGUE OF BIAS (2017), https://catalogofbias.org/biases/hawthorne-effect/
[https://perma.cc/B2R8-PLYG].
144. ICCPR, supra note 96.
145. ICCPR, supra note 96.
146. The International Bill of Human Rights consists of three documents: (1) the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, (2) the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights, and (3) the ICCPR. Together, they address various issues including
“racial discrimination, torture, enforced disappearances, disabilities, and the rights of
women, children, migrants, minorities, and indigenous peoples. The Foundation of Human
Rights Law, UNITED NATIONS, https://www.un.org/en/sections/universal-declaration/foundationinternational-human-rights-law/index.html [https://perma.cc/BN29-8UQQ]; ICCPR FAQ,
ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/assets/faq_iccpr_updated_april_2014.pdf
[https://perma.cc/TV3T-L7PH].
147. ICCPR, supra note 96, at art. 17.
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what purposes. Every individual should also be able to ascertain which public
[authorities] or private individuals or bodies control or may control their files.148

This Comment requires nations to regulate FRT nationally with adequate
storage measures for biometric data and disclosure of FRT use.
The ICCPR also provides that each nation must “respect and . . . ensure
to all individuals within its territory . . . the rights recognized in the present
Covenant, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, . . .
religion, . . . [or] national or social origin . . . .”149
Article 9 of the treaty states “[n]o one shall be subjected to arbitrary
arrest or detention.”150
However, Article 12 of the ICCPR, provides that all of the rights stated
in the treaty can be restricted in ways “necessary to protect national security,
public order . . . public health or morals or the rights and freedoms of others,
and are consistent with the other rights recognized in the [ICCPR].”151
Ratification of a treaty signifies intent to be bound by the treaty,
whereas solely signing it does not establish consent to be bound, just a
willingness to continue in the treaty making process.152 The five countries,
China, France, the United Kingdom, the United States, and the Russian
Federation, have all signed the ICCPR. 153 Thus, all nations have an
obligation to “refrain, in good faith, from acts that would defeat the object
and purpose of the treaty.” 154 All but China have ratified the ICCPR,
committing to ensure that their citizens are not subjected to “arbitrary or
unlawful interference with [their] privacy.”155

148. U.N. Human Rights Committee, CCPR General Comment No. 16: Article 17
(Right to Privacy), The Right to Respect of Privacy, Family, Home and Correspondence,
and Protection of Honour and Reputation (Apr. 8, 1988).
149. ICCPR, supra note 96, at art. 12.
150. Id. at art. 9.
151. Id. at art. 12.
152. What is the Difference Between Signing, Ratification and Accession of UN
Treaties, UNITED NATIONS (Dec. 17, 2020, 11:05 AM), https://ask.un.org/faq/14594 [https://
perma.cc/DWG7-CTWJ] [hereinafter What is the Difference].
153. Status of International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Sept. 11, 2021,
10:50 AM), https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/MTDSG/Volume%20I/Chapter%20IV/
IV-4.en.pdf [perma.cc/9CEC-8B57].
154. What is the Difference, supra note 152.
155. ICCPR, supra note 96, at art. 17.
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C. European Convention on Human Rights
The European Convention on Human Rights is an international treaty
aimed at protecting human rights.156 It has been ratified by France, Russia,
and the United Kingdom.157 The treaty provides that “[e]veryone has the
right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his
correspondence.” 158 Additionally it states that:
There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this
right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic
society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic wellbeing of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of
health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.159

D. European Union General Data Protection Regulation
The European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation sets out
standards for the processing and collection of biometric data in countries
in the European Union (“EU”), which includes France. 160 Under the
GDPR guidelines, biometric data includes data relating to the “physical,
physiological or behavioral characteristics of a natural person, . . . such
as facial images. . . .”161 The GDPR generally does not allow the use of
biometric data collection unless an exception applies under the regulation.
The GDPR also sets express limitations on the transfer of data to other
countries, which, because FRT utilizes biometric data, limits the transfer
of FRT information between countries outside of the EU.162
E. UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights
The issue of company regulation has been addressed on a global scale,
but no legally binding regulation has been set. The UN has endorsed the
Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights which set the first global
standard for preventing and addressing adverse human rights impacts

156. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art.
8, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221.
157. Chart of Signatures and Ratifications of Treaty 005, Council of Europe (Mar. 7,
2021, 3:26 PM), https://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list/-/conventions/treaty/005/
signatures?p_auth=DJRVOml0 [https://perma.cc/8DTZ-SKQS].
158. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art.
8, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221.
159. Id.
160. Council Regulation 2016/679, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1 (EU).
161. Id. at art. 4.
162. Id. at art. 2.
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associated with business activity.163 The principles apply to nations and
businesses and instruct them to abide by international law in business so
to maintain “socially sustainable globalization.” 164 The framework of
principles is not legally binding.165
V. FRT USE AND IMPLICATIONS IN EACH OF THE FIVE NATIONS
A. FRT Use in Each of the Five Nations
The use of FRT is prevalent in each of the five nations that hold
permanent seats at the UN Security Council. The FRT implementation has
not come without challenge; there is widespread public backlash against
the use of FRT in each of these nations. Despite the growing public
uncertainty as FRT continues to expand in use, none of these nations have
legislation specific to FRT nor do they have biometric data legislation
with strong enough teeth to prevent its use. All five nations claim to be
implementing and/or using the technology for national security and/or
public health purposes.
1. China
In China, FRT is technically regulated by the Cybersecurity Law of the
People’s Republic of China, and although it specifically discusses biometric
data,166 it has not been strong enough to limit the use of FRT in the
country. In the spring of 2020, Chinese legislatures drafted new legislation
with a stronger focus on biometrics to create teeth and address the very
clear need for greater protection, but the legislation has not yet come to
fruition.167 Currently, there is ongoing litigation regarding private use of
163. U.N. Hum. Rts. Council, Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights,
A/HRC/17/31 (2011), https://www.ohchr.org/documents/publications/guidingprinciples
businesshr_en.pdf [perma.cc/34XS-M2UT].
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Cybersecurity Law of the People’s Republic of China (promulgated by the
Standing Comm. of the Nat’l People’s Cong., Nov. 7, 2015, effective June 1, 2017),
art. 53, LEXIS 1603.
167. Seungha Lee, Coming into Focus: China’s Facial Recognition Regulations,
CTR. FOR STRATEGIC & INT’L STUD. (May 4, 2020), https://www.csis.org/blogs/trustee-chinahand/coming-focus-chinas-facial-recognition-regulations#:~:text=Facial%20recognition
%20in%20China%20is,the%20People’s%20Republic%20of%20China.&text=It%20spec
ifies%20guidelines%20on%20data,collection%2C%20abuse%2C%20and%20access
[https://perma.cc/9B8C-UDLL].
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FRT by a park, which is the first time FRT has been legally challenged in
the nation.168
China has a vast network of cameras across the country to enable the
widespread use of facial recognition technology. 169 The country has at
least 626 million FRT cameras in place.170 The cameras have been placed
in a myriad of locations including railways, airports, gyms, offices,
dormitories, exhibition halls,171 hotels, public toilets, and the entrance of
apartment buildings.172
The technology is also used by police to track suspects and monitor
suspicious behavior, to spot suspects, and to predict and prevent crime.173
FRT databases catalogue for those with “criminal records, mental illnesses,
records of drug use, and those who petitioned the government over
grievances.”174 Many companies are producing the technology in China,
these include Yitu, Megvii, SenseTime, and Cloudwalk.175
In the past, the Chinese government used FRT for legitimate a nd
beneficial purposes, but there is a growing concern among the Chinese
population that the practice has become overly intrusive.176 Currently, the
Chinese government uses FRT for intimidation and mass surveillance of
the Chinese people. 177 For example, all Chinese phone users that use a
SIM card must submit mandatory facial scans to the government through
FRT.178

168. Id.
169. Emily Feng, How China is Using Facial Recognition Technology, NPR (Dec.
16, 2020, 4:24 PM), https://www.npr.org/2019/12/16/788597818/how-china-is-usingfacial-recognition-technology [https://perma.cc/684P-U2M8].
170. Lauren Dudley, China’s Ubiquitous Facial Recognition Privacy Backlash, THE
DIPLOMAT (Mar. 7, 2020), https://thediplomat.com/2020/03/chinas-ubiquitous-facialrecognition-tech-sparks-privacy-backlash/ [https://perma.cc/596E-U8KG].
171. Ma Zhenhuan, Park Alters Entry Rules Following Facial Recognition Tech
Lawsuit, CHINA DAILY (Updated Nov. 7, 2019), http://global.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201911/07/
WS5dc38381a310cf3e35575f3a.html [https://perma.cc/EQ28-YU2A].
172. Denyer, supra note 1.
173. Denyer, supra note 1.
174. Mozur, supra note 14.
175. Mozur, supra note 14.
176. Sam Shead, Chinese Residents Worry About Rise of Facial Recognition, BBC
(Dec. 5, 2019), https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-50674909 [https://perma.cc/
X2TC-3PJX].
177. See Mozur, supra note 14.
178. Lily Kuo, China Brings in Mandatory Facial Recognition for Mobile Phone
Users, THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 2, 2019), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/dec/02/
china-brings-in-mandatory-facial-recognition-for-mobile-phone-users [https://perma.cc/
FQ9N-Y58K].
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One major use of FRT in China,179 which has raised a global outcry, has
been the tracking and detainment of the Uighur Muslim population.180
Uighurs are a Muslim minority group in China.181 The Chinese government
uses FRT to track the movements of Chinese Uighurs and looks f or
members of the Uighur population based on their facial characteristics
using FRT.182
International data has been used to train FRT used in China, including
the FRT used by China to detain members of the Uighur population.183 A
database, aptly called “Brainwash,” which included 10,000 facial images
of potentially unaware184 United States café goers was made public and
subsequently used in China by a company which provided surveillance
technology used to monitor the Uighurs.185
China keeps watch on the eleven million members of the Uighur
population in China,186 and over one million Uighurs have been put in
one of the eighty-five identified detainment camps set aside for the
Uighurs since 2017.187 China has defended its detainment of the Uighurs
in the name of anti-terrorism, yet Uighurs have been singled out and detained
using FRT based only on their apparent presentation of race, ethnicity,
and religion.188

179. See Data Leak Reveals how China ‘Brainwashes’ Uighurs in Prison Camps,
BBC (Nov. 24, 2019), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-26414014 [https://
perma.cc/P72E-UUBB] [hereinafter Data Leak].
180. Humeyra Pamuk & David Brunnstrom, U.S. Leads Condemnation of China for
‘Horiffic’ Repression of Muslims, REUTERS (Sept. 24, 2019, 3:19 PM), https://www.
reuters.com/article/us-usa-china-un-xinjiang/u-s-leads-condemnation-of-china-for-horrificrepression-of-muslims-idUSKBN1W92PX [https://perma.cc/M4P7-KR69].
181. See Data Leak, supra note 179.
182. Mozur, supra note 14.
183. Metz, Growing Stronger, supra note 107.
184. A research study conducted by Stanford University collected facial data from
café goers in San Francisco, California, United States. The research done by Stanford to
collect facial recognition data did not acknowledge whether or not the café patrons knew
they were being photographed for research. See Metz, Growing Stronger, supra note 107.
185. Metz, Growing Stronger, supra note 107.
186. Mozur, supra note 14.
187. Bryan Wood, What is Happening with the Uighurs in China, PBS NEWS HOUR,
https://www.pbs.org/newshour/features/uighurs/ [https://perma.cc/DD4U-JFRB].
188. Mozur, supra note 14.
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China has publicly claimed the camps are for reformation and re-education,
but those who have left the camps have reported abuse.189 Uighurs who
had been in the camps said they were “detained, interrogated and beaten
because of their religion.”190 Those detained have reportedly been subject
to “brainwashing,” and human rights advocates say the camps are a “gross
human rights violation.”191
Recently, it was reported that Uighurs in the camps were subjected to
forced labor, including mask production due to the Coronavirus outbreak.192
Some fear the Chinese government will use Coronavirus as an excuse for
increased detention and policing of the Uighurs.193
In September 2019, the U.S. and twenty-nine other countries condemned
the Chinese camps.194 China has recently stated the camps are closed, but
there is significant reason to doubt this claim by the Chinese government.195
The Chinese use of FRT to detain and potentially abuse Uighurs illustrates
one of the key issues of FRT use: profiling based upon stereotypical
identifying features.
2. France
France recently began using facial recognition technology. 196 The
French government first used the city of Nice as a testing ground for mass
surveillance through FRT in 2019.197 This newfound use of FRT was met
with public outcry largely due to the lack of regulatory framework for the
technology. 198 Since its implementation, several groups called on the
government to institute a moratorium to ensure the nation’s use of FRT
189. Chris Buckley, China Is Detaining Muslims in Vast Numbers. The Goal:
‘Transformation’, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 8, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/08/world/
asia/china-uighur-muslim-detention-camp.html [https://perma.cc/UCB9-NEW8].
190. Wood, supra note 187.
191. Data Leak, supra note 179.
192. Muyi Xiao et al., China is Using Uighur Labor to Produce Face Masks, N.Y.
TIMES (July 19, 2020, updated Aug. 13, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/19/
world/asia/china-mask-forced-labor.html?action=click&module=RelatedLinks&pgtype=
Article [https://perma.cc/J9JE-H5LS].
193. Javier C. Hernández, China Locks Down Xinjiang to Fight Covid-19 Angering
Residents, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 24, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/25/world/asia/
china-xinjiang-covid.html [https://perma.cc/FNB4-6K7C].
194. Pamuk & Brunnstrom, supra note 180.
195. Buckley, supra note 189.
196. The specific date and year are not certain due to inadequate transparency, although
it became known around 2019. See Martin Untersinger, Facial Recognition: The CNIL
Ticks on the Results of the Nice Experience, LE MONDE (Aug. 28, 2019), https://www.lemonde.
fr/pixels/article/2019/08/28/reconnaissance-faciale-la-cnil-tique-sur-le-bilan-de-lexperience-nicoise_5503769_4408996.html [https://perma.cc/3AB4-Q4CJ].
197. Id.
198. Id.
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does not result in the level of surveillance seen in China. 199 The nation’s
security watchdog, the Commission Nationale de I’informatique et des
Libertés (CNIL), has called for legislation regarding FRT, but no legislation
has been passed.200
In 2019, France announced its plan for national FRT surveillance through
an initiative called “Alicem” which will create facial IDs for residents
using FRT.201 Clearview, an American company, supplied at least part of
this FRT.202 Although the country’s independent privacy regulator pointed
to issues of security regarding Alicem203 and other opponents say the plan
may break EU General Data Protection Regulation, the nation appears to
be moving forward with the plan.204 The EU briefly considered a ban on
FRT for public surveillance but has since dropped that idea.205
3. Russian Federation
Russia began rolling out mass surveillance facial recognition cameras
in early 2020, which prompted backlash and a suit against the government.206
There is concern from the Russian people regarding the lack of regulation,
oversight, and data protection regarding the nation’s use of FRT. 207
Although Russian law requires explicit consent from an individual for the
government to collect biometric data via FRT, the law allows for FRT use

199. Facial Recognition: The Urgency of a Moratorium, LIBÉRATION (Dec. 17, 2019),
https://www.liberation.fr/debats/2019/12/17/reconnaissance-faciale-l-urgence-d-unmoratoire_1769794/ [https://perma.cc/C7PV-U75S] [hereinafter Libération].
200. Untersinger, supra note 196.
201. Helene Fouquet, France Set to Roll out Nationwide Facial Recognition ID
Program, B LOOMBERG (Oct. 2, 2019, 9:00 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/
articles/2019-10-03/french-liberte-tested-by-nationwide-facial-recognition-id-plan
[https://perma.cc/S872-4P6Y].
202. Shead, Facial Recognition Tech, supra note 48.
203. Délibération 2018-342 du 18 Octobre 2018, LÉGIFRANCE, https://www.legifrance.
gouv.fr/cnil/id/CNILTEXT000038477075/ [https://perma.cc/ZUS3-TWD9] [hereinafter
Délibération].
204. Fouquet, supra note 201.
205. Foo Yun Chee, EU Drops Idea of Facial Recognition Ban in Public Areas:
Paper, REUTERS (Jan. 29, 2020, 3:09 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-eu-ai/eudrops-idea-of-facial-recognition-ban-in-public-areas-paper-idUSKBN1ZS37Q [https://
perma.cc/8ZDM-7RM2].
206. Ilyushina, supra note 62.
207. Russia Expands Facial Recognition Despite Privacy Concerns, HUM. RTS.
WATCH (Oct. 2, 2020, 8:00 AM), https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/10/02/russia-expandsfacial-recognition-despite-privacy-concerns [https://perma.cc/6L8P-3VHJ].
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without consent for justice or national security purposes.208 A recent ruling
from a suit challenging the nation’s use of FRT was dismissed, solidifying
the legality of its implementation, and showing legal objections in Russian
courts to the use of FRT will very likely be dismissed.209
Moscow has at least 105,000 FRT surveillance cameras, all of which
are developed by the firm NTechLabs.210 The country began using FRT
to track individuals infected with Coronavirus using public health as a
justification for rolling out large numbers of FRT cameras. 211 In June of
2020, Russia announced a plan to install FRT in every school in the
country.212
The Moscow Department of Technology claims that FRT is being used
to ensure safety.213 Police officers are allowed to make requests to view
the FRT surveillance video.214 However, even when police in Russia were
not yet using the FRT, police officers allegedly paid people with access to
the technology to run searches via internet transactions.215
4. United Kingdom
The UK implemented FRT as early as 2015, despite public backlash and
reports showing the technology being deployed was extremely inaccurate.216
The United Kingdom has no legislation specifically regarding the use of
facial recognition technology.217 Despite the tech’s growing use in the
208. Federal’nyĭ Zakon No. 152-FZ RF o Personal’nyh Dannyh [Federal Law No.
152-FZ of the Russian Federation on Personal Data], ROSSIĪSKAIA GAZETA [ROS. GAZ]
July 8, 2006.
209. Alexander Marrow, Russian Court Rules in Favor of Facial Recognition Over
Privacy Claims, REUTERS (Mar. 3, 2020, 8:22 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/usrussia-technology-facialrecognition/russian-court-rules-in-favor-of-facial-recognitionover-privacy-claims-idUSKBN20Q29U [https://perma.cc/DY37-UY3U].
210. Alina Polyakova & Chris Meserole, Exporting Digital Authoritarianism: The
Russian and Chinese Models, BROOKINGS (Aug. 2019), https://www.brookings.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2019/08/FP_20190827_digital_authoritarianism_polyakova_meserole.pdf.
211. Ilyushina, supra note 62.
212. Russia to Install ‘Orwell’ Facial Recognition Tech in Every School – Vedomosti,
THE MOSCOW TIMES (June 16, 2020), https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2020/06/16/
russia-to-install-orwell-facial-recognition-tech-in-every-school-vedomosti-a70585 [https://
perma.cc/GU73-X2PK].
213. Marrow, supra note 209.
214. Marrow, supra note 209.
215. Patrick Reevell, How Russia is Using Facial Recognition to Police its Coronavirus
Lockdown, ABC (Apr. 30, 2020, 2:06 AM), https://abcnews.go.com/International/russiafacial-recognition-police-coronavirus-lockdown/story?id=70299736 [https://perma.cc/
H8PW-TMVD].
216. Stop Facial Recognition, BIG BROTHER WATCH, https://bigbrotherwatch.org.uk/
campaigns/stop-facial-recognition/.
217. Davey Winder, Police Facial Recognition Use Unlawful – U.K. Court of Appeal
Makes Landmark Ruling, FORBES (Aug. 12, 2020, 6:53 AM), https://www.forbes.com/
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country, in August of 2020, a South Wales court ruled that the use of FRT
was illegal.218 The court cited the technology as being a violation of the
European Convention on Human Rights because the South Wales Police’s
implementation of the technology left “too broad a discretion” to individual
police officers.219 While this ruling was specifically about Wales, this ruling
has the potential to be far-reaching and render the technology illegal in the
country until the government approves its use through statute.220
The London Metropolitan Police has been using FRT since January
2020, with the stated purpose of identifying serious and violent criminals.221
The UK has a history of video surveillance, but the addition of FRT increases
the scrutiny of the surveillance and adds to the amount of surveillance
policing in the nation.222 The United Kingdom also uses FRT developed
outside of the EU; for example, the American company Clearview sells
its technology to the UK.223
5. United States
There is currently no national FRT regulation in the United States.224
Despite the lack of federal regulation, three states, California, New Hampshire,
and Oregon, have placed restrictions on the technology’s use by police

sites/daveywinder/2020/08/12/police-facial-recognition-use-unlawful-uk-court-of-appealmakes-landmark-ruling/?sh=3e1c18b775e0 [https://perma.cc/BNN4-78P2].
218. Bridges, R v. South Wales Police [2020] EWCA (Civ) 1058, [201] (appeal
taken from Eng.) (UK).
219. Id. at 124.
220. Sam Shead, UK Court Finds Facial Recognition Technology Used by Police
was Unlawful, CNBC (Aug. 11, 2020, 9:55 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2020/08/11/swpfacial-recognition-unlawful.html [https://perma.cc/XG32-GE3L]; Winder, supra note 217.
221. Danny Shaw, Met Police to Deploy Facial Recognition Cameras, BBC (Jan.
30, 2020), https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-51237665 [https://perma.cc/6KSX-ECVG].
222. Adam Satariano, London Police are Taking Surveillance to a Whole New Level,
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 24, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/24/business/londonpolice-facial-recognition.html [https://perma.cc/J5PX-CKS3].
223. Shead, Facial Recognition Tech, supra note 48.
224. Facial Recognition and Biometric Tech. Moratorium Act of 2020, S. 4084, 116th
Cong. (2019-2020); Pam Greenberg, Facial Recognition Gaining Measured Acceptance,
NCSL (Sept. 18, 2020), https://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-informationtechnology/facial-recognition-gaining-measured-acceptance-magazine2020.aspx [https://
perma.cc/E4AF-PQWR]; James Andrew Lewis, Facial Recognition Technology: Responsible
Use Principles and the Legislative Landscape, CSIS (Sept. 29, 2021), https://www.csis.
org/analysis/facial-recognition-technology-responsible-use-principles-and-legislativelandscape [https://perma.cc/8GBB-6ET5].
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officers.225 Several cities have taken the issue of lack of federal regulation
into their own hands and have banned or put a moratorium on the use of
FRT; typically only banning its use by city agencies including police.226
The city of Portland, Oregon took a more drastic approach and banned the
use of FRT in both private and government use. 227 In 2020, the United
States Congress attempted to pass legislation that would impose limits on
the use of biometric surveillance systems by federal and state government
entities, but the legislation failed to get past Senate introduction.228
The U.S. publicly acknowledged its widespread use of facial recognition
technology in 2017.229 That year, President Trump signed an executive
order to deploy FRT at U.S. airports 230 and take data from both citizens
and non-citizens.231 The original order allowed citizens to opt out, but the
United States Customs and Border Protections removed the opt-out possibility
in 2019.232 This change was said to be implemented for anti-terrorism
purposes; by 2021, FRT will scan all people passing through the top twenty
U.S. airports.233
Additionally, Clearview has also been used in the United States by at least
fifty educational institutions.234
Beginning in 2019, the United States’ Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (“ICE”) agency has used Clearview, a U.S.-based facial recognition
company, for Homeland Security investigations, and enforcement and
removal operations.235 Although it is unclear what exactly the agency is
using the technology for, it is possible the technology was used in connection
225. Facial Recognition and Biometric Tech. Moratorium Act of 2020, S. 4084,
116th Cong. (2019-2020); Greenberg, supra note 224.
226. Shannon Flynn, 13 Cities Where Police are Banned from Using Facial Recognition
Tech, INNOVATION & TECH TODAY, https://innotechtoday.com/13-cities-where-police-arebanned-from-using-facial-recognition-tech/ [https://perma.cc/W6Z6-NCMH].
227. Id.
228. Facial Recognition and Biometric Tech. Moratorium Act of 2020, S. 4084,
116th Cong. (2019-2020); Greenberg, supra note 224.
229. Malkia Devich-Cyril, Defund Facial Recognition, THE ATLANTIC (July 5, 2020),
https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2020/07/defund-facial-recognition/613771/
[https://perma.cc/4PKT-RMXL].
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Exec. Order No. 13780 82 FR 13209 (Mar. 6, 2017); Davey Alba, The US
Government Will be Scanning Your Face At 20 Top Airports, Documents Show, BUZZFEED
NEWS (Mar. 11, 2019, 9:27 AM), https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/daveyalba/thesedocuments-reveal-the-governments-detailed-plan-for [https://perma.cc/W6TL-EWRE].
234. Ryan Mac et al., Clearview’s Facial Recognition App Has Been Used By The
Justice Department, ICE, Macy’s, Walmart, And The NBA, BUZZFEED NEWS (Feb. 27,
2020), https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/ryanmac/clearview-ai-fbi-ice-global-lawenforcement [https://perma.cc/2MZ4-Z2BB].
235. Id.
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with the over 50,000 people detained and kept in poor conditions in
immigration camps at the U.S. Mexico border.236 The agency has also
used the technology to analyze drivers licenses of the drivers in at least
three U.S. states without their permission.237
The United States Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) has long
been using the technology, running over 390,000 searches to date.238 The
FBI says the technology is used to “preserve [the] nation’s freedoms, ensure . . .
liberties are protected, and preserve . . . security.”239 However, little is
known about when the agency conducts searches, who is targeted by the
searches, or the frequency of false positives.240
Since 2019, at least 600 law enforcement agencies in the U.S. have
started using Clearview FRT, which is implemented through hidden cameras
in uniforms.241 This technology identifies individuals and “predict[s] emotional
states and the likeliness a given individual might commit a crime.”242 The
United States first used emotion-reading surveillance technology in airports
in 2006 in an attempt to find terrorists, but the technology was allegedly
used for racial profiling as well.243
B. Implications of FRT Use as National Security Leaders
As leaders of the UN Security Council, these nations must “maintain
international peace and security in accordance with the principles and
purposes of the United Nations.”244 One of the four main purposes of the
United Nations is to “promot[e] respect for human rights.” China, France,
Russia, and the United Kingdom are all also members of the UN Human
236. Madeleine Joung, What is Happening at Migrant Detention Centers? Here’s
What to Know, T IME (July 12, 2019, 2:01 PM), https://time.com/5623148/migrantdetention-centers-conditions/ [https://perma.cc/3RM7-ZS5W].
237. Catie Edmondson, ICE Used Facial Recognition to Mine State Driver’s License
Databases, N.Y. TIMES (July 7, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/07/us/politics/
ice-drivers-licenses-facial-recognition.html [https://perma.cc/6STV-EXJ8].
238. Rosenthal & Yan, supra note 71.
239. Id.
240. Drew Harwell, FBI, ICE Find State Driver’s License Photos are a Gold Mine
for Facial-Recognition Searches, WASH. POST (July 7, 2019, 12:54 PM), https://www.
washingtonpost.com/technology/2019/07/07/fbi-ice-find-state-drivers-license-photos-aregold-mine-facial-recognition-searches/ [https://perma.cc/BK4X-94S9].
241. Hill, The Secretive Company, supra note 21.
242. Damiani, supra note 2.
243. Schwartz, supra note 43.
244. U.N. Security Council, Functions and Powers, https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/
content/functions-and-powers [https://perma.cc/KA5B-86Z8].
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Rights Council.245 Yet each nation has implemented FRT in ways that may
violate an individual’s basic assumption of privacy, which again, is a basic
human right under international law. With the nations that hold leadership
positions in the UN clearly using FRT, and likely using it in a way that
violates a basic assumption of privacy, international law has been rendered
meaningless.
C. Constitutional Provisions
The impact of constitutional privacy protections seems to depend on the
courts working independence, as well as whether or not the nation has a
privacy provision at all.
Both Russia and China characterize privacy as a fundamental constitutional
right.246 However, due to the lack of judicial independence,247 FRT has
largely remained unchecked, and the privacy of the nation’s people is
being violated.248 Russia’s lack of adherence to its constitution could also
be linked to its history of not adhering to its constitutional human rights
promises.249
The United Kingdom and the United States both have tangential
constitutional privacy rights. The UK provision, which has been implicated
by courts, is the European Convention on Human Rights and was sufficient
to render FRT use illegal in Whales.250 No known U.S. cases have challenged
FRT specifically citing constitutional protections.251
France is the only one of the five nations to have no constitutional right
to privacy.252 It seems that the nation has taken the quickest approach to
implementation, going from no use of FRT to using FRT to establish
facial IDs for residents in a matter of a few years.253 With no constitutional
right to privacy, the nation has quickly been able to grow its FRT use to a
245. U.N. Human Rights Council, Current Membership of the Human Rights Council
for the 15th Cycle (Jan. 1, 2021), https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/Pages/Current
Members.aspx [https://perma.cc/58CG-D34S].
246. See infra Sections IV.A.1, IV.A.3.
247. Russian Federation, supra note 132; IN THE NAME OF JUSTICE, supra note 132.
248. See infra Sections II.A.1., II.A.3.
249. Arch Getty, supra note 138.
250. Iman Barr, Police use of facial recognition technology infringes European
Convention on Human Rights, HUM. RTS. L. CTR. (Aug. 8, 2020), https://www.hrlc.org.au/
human-rights-case-summaries/2020/8/28/police-use-of-facial-recognition-technologyinfringes-european-convention-on-human-rights [https://perma.cc/L9NM-GSZ8].
251. Nathan Freed Wessler, A Federal Court Sounds the Alarm on the Privacy Harms of
Face Recognition Technology, ACLU (Aug. 9, 2019), https://www.aclu.org/blog/privacytechnology/surveillance-technologies/federal-court-sounds-alarm-privacy-harms-face
[https://perma.cc/4U5Y-S9FS].
252. See infra Section IV.A.
253. Fouquet, supra note 201.
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level that rivals China. France is, however, bound to the European Convention
on Human Rights, so this may be limiting to France’s FRT growth in the
future.
Comparing the constitutional right to privacy in these nations, it seems
that having a constitutional right to privacy does not mean privacy rights
will be protected, especially if an independent judiciary does not operationally
function as an independent judiciary. Conversely, if a nation has no
privacy rights listed, or weak rights, privacy violations can grow quickly
when the opportunity arises and remain relatively unchecked due to the
lack of constitutional teeth to prevent its use. Without required disclosure
there is no way to know with certainty that this observation is accurate.
D. ICCPR and Privacy Implications of FRT
First turning to Article 17 of the ICCPR which grants freedom from
“arbitrary or unlawful interference [of] . . . privacy,”254 the four ratifying
nations have seemingly unlawfully interfered with privacy of their citizens
by implementing FRT. As the only country that did not ratify the ICCPR,
China is still obliged to “refrain, in good faith, from acts that would defeat
the object and purpose of the treaty,”255 which seems incompatible with
its extremely widespread use of FRT across the country in direct violation
of its Constitution. If the definition provided in Comment 16256 is considered
the definition of privacy in this analysis, it seems likely that all of the nations
abused their power and violated Article 17. With no clear definition of the
term “privacy,” the issue becomes much more complex and more difficult
to determine whether privacy is technically being violated.
In China, FRT is clearly being used arbitrarily to detain Uighurs and
keep them in camps, in apparent contravention of Article 9.257 The excuse,

254. ICCPR, supra note 96, at art. 17.
255. What is the Difference, supra note 152; China: Ratify Key International Human
Rights Treaty, H UM . R TS . W ATCH (Oct. 28, 2020), https://www.hrw.org/news/2013/
10/08/china-ratify-key-international-human-rights-treaty [https://perma.cc/H6V9-WCEZ].
256. See U.N. Human Rights Committee, CCPR General Comment No. 16: Article
17 (Right to Privacy), The Right to Respect of Privacy, Family, Home and Correspondence,
and Protection of Honour and Reputation (Apr. 8, 1988).
257. Lindsay Maizland, China’s Repression of Uyghurs in Xinjiang, COUNCIL ON
F OREIGN R ELS . (Mar. 1, 2021 7:00 AM), https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/chinasrepression-uyghurs-xinjiang [https://perma.cc/H4G8-WPZ9]; ICCPR, supra note 96, at
art. 9.
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again, is national security. The United States has also potentially violated
Article 9 if ICE used FRT to detain and cage non-citizens.258
Finally, Article 12 is especially relevant to the ICCPR discussion as it
restricts the rights in Article 17 and Article 9 if national security is claimed
to be the justification for the action. Each of the Security Council members
has excused their FRT use by citing national security. Although the Article
12 exceptions are extremely important considerations, the provisions of
this Convention are weak in that almost any use of facial recognition
technology can be justified through Article 12. Additionally, without the
requirement to disclose the use of facial recognition technology, it is unclear
if these countries are actually using the technology for a purpose justified
under Article 12.
Article 2 of the ICCPR does not allow for the rights instilled by the ICCPR
to be different based on gender, religion, and national origin, but by allowing
nations’ use of FRT to be justified under Article 12, the ICCPR aides in the
disproportionate impact of FRT use on people of different religions, genders,
and races.
Despite the many potential violations under the ICCPR, none of the five
nations are likely to face any legal consequences because of Article 12’s
excuses for FRT use when claimed to be used for national security. Article
12 of the ICCPR provides a loophole for nations and is insufficient in
protecting the fundamental right to privacy the ICCPR grants. The ICCPR
does not protect the citizens of signatories, especially people of color,
transgender, and non-binary individuals, but rather provides powerful
nations with an excuse to intrude on the privacy of its people.
E. European Convention on Human Rights
As signatories, France, the UK, and Russia are all bound by the European
Convention on Human Rights, but the treaty has only been enough to
render FRT use illegal in part of one of the nations. With the UK ruling,
however, there is the potential for this convention to render more FRT use
illegal in the future.
F. European Union GDPR
France, as a member of the European Union,259 is bound by the GDPR,
which provides protections against the collection of biometric data. The

258. Joung, supra note 236; ICCPR, supra note 96.
259. Countries in the EU and EEA, GOV.UK, https://www.gov.uk/eu-eea#:~:text=
The%20EU%20countries%20are%3A,%2C%20Slovenia%2C%20Spain%20and%20Sw
eden.
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nation’s security watchdog entity, the CNIL, has reported that the nation’s
Alicem facial ID program potentially does not fall within the guidelines
of the GDPR.260 Despite this and backlash from citizens, the nation has
continued to roll out the program. 261 Like the ICCPR, this international
regulation does not appear to be strong enough to prevent France’s use of
FRT for applications with negative privacy implications.
G. Company Self-Regulation Efforts and Third-Party Standards
With so little regulation and ethical guidance regarding FRT use, several
FRT companies have turned to self-regulation.262 In China, the company
Megvii created a six-part guideline for FRT implementation including
provisions highlighting the need for data security and privacy risk aversion.263
There is also an initiative from twenty-seven tech companies including
SenseTime, Tencent, and Xiaomi to draft industry standards for FRT.264
While this is not binding, it does put pressure on lawmakers to create
legally binding standards.
In the U.S., in June of 2020, Microsoft, Amazon, and IBM all put out
statements regarding their use of FRT.265 The company IBM stated it would
stop selling the technology altogether, but as for the other companies, these
statements did not come without limitations.266 Amazon implemented a oneyear moratorium on the use of their FRT by U.S. law enforcement to give
Congress time to pass regulation.267 Microsoft instituted a moratorium on its
FRT use until the issue was brought up in Congress.268 Despite Congressional
efforts to pass legislation that would impose limits on the use of biometric
surveillance systems by federal and state government entities, the legislation
did not get past Senate introduction.269 Tech giant Google has in the past
260. See Fouquet, supra note 201.
261. Fouquet, supra note 201.
262. Browne, supra note 42.
263. Lee, supra note 167.
264. Lee, supra note 167.
265. Short Wave, supra note 17, at 0:09.
266. Short Wave, supra note 17, at 4:18.
267. Short Wave, supra note 17, at 4:25.
268. Brian Fung, Tech Companies Push for Nationwide Facial Recognition Law. Now
Comes the Hard Part, CNN (June 13, 2020, 1:06 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2020/06/13/
tech/facial-recognition-policy/index.html [https://perma.cc/GDK5-3NVS].
269. Facial Recognition and Biometric Tech. Moratorium Act of 2020, S. 4084,
116th Cong. (2019-2020); Greenberg, supra note 224; Lauren Feiner & Annie Palmer,
Rules Around Facial Recognition and Policing Remain Blurry, CNBC (June 12, 2021),
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stated their FRT would not be implemented for general purpose before the
company “work[s] through important technology and policy questions.”270
Microsoft has also made a direct appeal specifically for international
regulation of FRT in 2018.271 The company called for corporate responsibility
in maintaining ethics in FRT, specifically citing the UN’s Guiding Principles
on Business and Human Rights as proposed guidelines.272
Some third-party organizations have created global non-binding standards,
guidelines, and best practice manuals for FRT use.273 These groups include
the International Biometrics and Identification Association, and the Institute
of Electrical and Electronics Engineers.274
VI. PROPOSED AND POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS
In an ever evolving and technology reliant world, there is a fine line
between new forms of technology like FRT being useful, and the technology
leading to a new and intrusive reality. Improper use of FRT is, at the very
least, problematic and ethically questionable. The technology has developed
and evolved faster than it can be regulated both nationally and internationally.275
This would not be nearly as problematic if the technology operated as
intended, but most FRT falls short due to algorithmic bias and lack of
accuracy.276
The group of countries permanently tasked by the UN to maintain international
security have all implemented, to some degree, facial recognition technology,277
each justifying their use of the tech with national security.278 By using the
technology in troubling ways, these nations are adding a new category of
activity that is justified because of national security. These five nations

https://www.cnbc.com/2021/06/12/a-year-later-tech-companies-calls-to-regulate-facialrecognition-met-with-little-progress.html [https://perma.cc/ZH72-EW7T].
270. Kent Walker, AI for Social Good in Asia Pacific, GOOGLE (Dec. 13, 2018),
https://www.blog.google/around-the-globe/google-asia/ai-social-good-asia-pacific/amp/
[https://perma.cc/WAA8-2AZX].
271. Brad Smith, Facial Recognition Technology: The Need for Public Regulation
and Corporate Responsibility, M ICROSOFT: M ICROSOFT ON THE ISSUES (July 13, 2018),
https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2018/07/13/facial-recognition-technology-theneed-for-public-regulation-and-corporate-responsibility/ [https://perma.cc/XU88-UK2A].
272. Id.; OHCHR and Business and Human Rights, OHCHR, https://www.ohchr.org/
EN/Issues/Business/Pages/BusinessIndex.aspx [https://perma.cc/VCK9-GM34].
273. Facial Recognition and Biometric Tech. Moratorium Act of 2020, S. 4084,
116th Cong. (2019-2020); Greenberg, supra note 224.
274. Greenberg, supra note 224.
275. Greenberg, supra note 224.
276. Greenberg, supra note 224.
277. See supra Section V.A.
278. Supra Section V.A.
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are tasked with maintaining international security under the UN Charter,
but at what cost?
The current national and international laws are not enough to deter any
of the nations from using facial recognition technology in ways that
infringe upon privacy rights. These issues are exacerbated for people of
color, women, transgender individuals, and those who do not present gender
according to binary norms.279 To ensure the privacy rights of all individuals
are adequately protected, more must be done to correct this growing invasion
of human rights.
The benefits of this technology are important to consider in the search
for solutions. There is a delicate balance to be found between the positive
uses of the technology and its harmful privacy violations. However, it is
important not to drastically chill technological innovation in this field due
to its likely growing list of beneficial uses, but restrictions and standards
must be in place for the benefits to outweigh the harms.
A. National FRT Regulation
One solution is for all nations to regulate FRT, to some degree, on a
national level. Technology has outgrown constitutional protections and
law in all five nations discussed above and must be met with strict
requirements to ensure privacy protections and to uphold human rights for
all individuals. The national regulation recommendations discussed below
are for the United States specifically but are generally applicable to all
five nations considered here, as well as many other nations. As the United
States Constitution does not explicitly protect privacy, passing legislation
specifically regarding FRT would allow suits against unjust FRT uses to
prevail.
It would be very symbolic for the United States to pass strict FRT
regulation in the beginning of Joe Biden’s Presidency. It would show the
world that his administration is serious about re-entering the world stage
and protecting human rights after Trump withdrew from international
relationships and the UN Human Rights Council and conducted several
human right’s atrocities during his term in office.280

279. See Libération, supra note 199; see also Damiani, supra note 2.
280. See, e.g., United States of America 2019, AMNESTY INT’L, https://www.amnesty.org/
en/countries/americas/united-states-of-america/report-united-states-of-america/ [https://
perma.cc/38D8-7XR6].
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1. Moratorium, Not a Ban
The first step in regulating FRT is to create a national moratorium on
FRT use by government agencies, or police agencies at a minimum. The
widespread and potentially large bias in the technology has too high of a
potential to create discrimination and disparate impacts to allow its use to
continue unregulated. The technology has continued to evolve,281 and will
continue to do so in ways that may create further problems for equity in
the technology, so the passing of a moratorium must be swift. A moratorium
should be put in place until strict regulation is passed which takes extra
precaution to ensure that all individuals are equitably protected from the
technology.
Several organizations have called for a ban on the use of FRT,282 but
this is likely not a feasible solution, nor is it the best solution for ensuring
marginalized communities are adequately protected. If a moratorium and
development of regulations are done correctly and quickly, the benefits of
the technology make the moratorium worthwhile.
It is difficult if not impossible to completely walk back on the current
FRT reliance and go “from an increasingly nonymous to an anonymous
society.”283 The technology has already been implemented and, while
shown to be beneficial, has invaded the privacy rights of millions of
individuals. At this point both nations and companies have invested
money, and the market for the technology is there. If a ban were imposed,
there is the potential for a black-market demand for FRT which would mean
less oversight and regulation than before. A black-market for FRT has
already been exposed in Russia even without a ban on FRT use.284
A ban is also not the best solution to protect marginalized communities
in the U.S. because of the recent rise in violence from white supremacist
extremists, which the Department of Homeland Security has labeled as

281. See, e.g., Damiani, supra note 2.
282. See e.g., Stop Facial Recognition, B IG BROTHER WATCH, https://bigbrother
watch.org.uk/campaigns/stop-facial-recognition/ [https://perma.cc/733E-YXYS]; see e.g.,
Foo Yun Chee, EU Privacy Watchdogs Call for Ban on Facial Recognition in Public
Spaces, REUTERS (June 21, 2021), https://www.reuters.com/technology/eu-privacy-watchdogscall-ban-facial-recognition-public-spaces-2021-06-21/ [https://perma.cc/4XSC-5SMJ];
see e.g., Press Release, Amnesty International, Ban Dangerous Facial Recognition Technology
that Amplifies Racist Policing (Jan. 26, 2021, 8:22 AM), https://www.amnesty.org/en/
latest/press-release/2021/01/ban-dangerous-facial-recognition-technology-that-amplifiesracist-policing/.
283. See Turley, supra note 97, at 2245.
284. See For Sale: Access to Moscow’s CCTV Network on Black Market, THE MOSCOW
TIMES (Dec. 6, 2019), https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2019/12/06/access-moscowscctv-network-facial-recognition-black-market-a68506 [https://perma.cc/PM6D-8R5V].
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“the most persistent and lethal threat in the Homeland.” 285 White
supremacists “have demonstrated longstanding intent to target racial . . .
minorities, [and] members of the LGBTQ+ community.”286 The technology
is essential in identifying culprits of these heinous crimes and reversing
the rise of white supremacism and extremism. The large and growing threat
to these communities highlights the need for FRT regulation to happen as
quickly as possible.
While a moratorium is necessary, there may be some circumstances
where exceptions to the moratorium should be upheld, as in the case
of protecting against terrorism. This terrorism exception is necessary with
the enhanced risk of domestic terrorism the U.S. faces. The technology
was used to identify the white supremacists who attacked the U.S. capital
on January 6th, 2021,287 and this type of FRT use would not be possible
without a terrorism exception to the moratorium.
The technology should not, however, be used for immigration purposes
or by police forces for standard crimes. This exception would not be a
general national security exception. There would need to be a requirement
of researched and justified risk from the threat; the harm to the public must
be balanced with the harm to human rights.
2. Regulatory Requirements
To ensure the regulation adequately addresses the privacy and equity
concerns arising from FRT, the regulation must be strict and specific. One
of the most crucial aspects of the regulation is the need for accuracy
standards. These accuracy standards must be extraordinarily high and must
be specifically tested against all races, ethnicities, and gender presentations
to ensure equality in FRT use.
Regulation must ensure that algorithm data is significantly diversified
by race, ethnicity, and gender to allow for the accuracy to increase and so
the chance of false matches and misidentifications would further be decreased.
These protections are essential to maintaining human rights and protecting
all individuals under the law.

285. U.S. DEP’T HOMELAND SEC., HOMELAND THREAT ASSESSMENT, 18 (Oct. 2020),
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/2020_10_06_homeland-threatassessment.pdf [https://perma.cc/URC2-RRNB].
286. Id.
287. Hill, The Facial-Recognition App, supra note 56.
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Regulation must also ensure the biometric data captured by FRT use is
adequately secured. Data breach has been an issue for the United States in
recent years,288 so the government must take greater action to ensure
biometric data is protected.
Once the regulation ensures that the technology itself is accurate,
unbiased, and secure, the regulation must provide that the technology is
equitably distributed into cities so as not to add to the over policing of
communities.289
While a very high accuracy standard is necessary, there is still a risk of
false matches, so regulation would need to include a requirement of human
analysis before government agencies can contact an individual based on
FRT matching. This would further decrease the chance of agency interaction
with falsely identified individuals.
FRT regulation must include additional requirements for commercial
one-to-one matching including consent and alternatives for those who do
not consent to the technology’s use. A consent requirement is not feasible
in one-to-many identification because the technology would not be able
to serve its basic function of surveilling, but in one-to-one matching, consent
is essential in ensuring equity. To ensure people are not disproportionately
impacted by FRT because of their race, gender, or gender presentation,
alternative options must be in place when FRT is used for access such as
entrance into gendered restrooms.
To ensure that FRT implemented after regulation is passed meets the
stringent requirements of the regulation, an independent third-party
organization must be established. This group would be tasked with rigorously
testing FRT being used and how the FRT has been implemented. Agencies
using FRT must be required to disclose their use of FRT to the third-party
group to ensure the technology is accurate, secure, and unbiased. Without
disclosure of FRT use, concerns related to human rights violations that the
tech may cause cannot be adequately addressed.
If the U.S. implemented strict regulation with the specificities discussed
above, companies would need to produce accurate, unbiased, and secure
FRT to sell in the U.S. Many companies, including Clearview which is selling

288. See, e.g., David E. Sanger, Russian Hackers Broke Into Federal Agencies, U.S.
Officials Suspect, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 13, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/13/
us/politics/russian-hackers-us-government-treasury-commerce.html [https://perma.cc/
WL6Q-C4YB].
289. See, e.g., West Baltimore Commission on Police Misconduct and the No
Boundaries Coalition, Over-Policed, Yet Underserved: The People’s Findings Regarding
Police Misconduct in West Baltimore, NO BOUNDARIES COALITION, http://www.noboundaries
coalition.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/No-Boundaries-Layout-Web-1.pdf [https://
perma.cc/XWH8-Y8JS].
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to many countries,290 would be likely to improve the technology they are
selling to all nations after improving the technology they are selling to the
U.S. so as to improve their competitive advantage amongst FRT competitors.
If multiple nations imposed strict regulation and standards for FRT, companies
would have no choice but to up their technology so to remain competitive
in these markets.
B. International FRT Regulation
National regulation is a necessary step in protecting against harm from
FRT, but the international scale of this technology renders regulation by
one nation alone insufficient; the international expansion of FRT necessitates
an international solution. While FRT would be bettered by several nations
instituting accuracy standards, to effectively prevent privacy violations
caused by FRT use for all individuals across all nations there must be global
and uniform regulation. While global regulation might be difficult to achieve,
it is clear that more must be done on an international scale.
Current international law is not sufficient to protect all people from
facial recognition technology. EU protections in the European Convention
on Human rights have been effective to some extent in the UK,291 but the
extent of its reach is questionable, and it has not rendered FRT use illegal
in either France or Russia. The ICCPR and GDPR have proven to not have
sufficient teeth to prevent misuse of FRT and provide protection on the
basis of race and gender presentation.
It has been suggested that a new comment for Article 17 of the ICCPR
with definitions of terms including more specificity for biometric data is
all that is necessary to protect against FRT,292 but this is not so. A new
comment and new definitions could help guide nations on what privacy
should be protected, but there are two fatal flaws with this suggestion: (1)
a comment is not binding,293 and (2) Article 12 still allows for the use of
FRT for national security.
The best solution may be for the United States to initiate an international
treaty or Security Council Resolution with a moratorium and similar
regulation as recommended above for individual nations. In doing so, the
290. Shead, Facial Recognition Tech, supra note 48.
291. Bridges, R v. South Wales Police [2020] EWCA (Civ) 1058, [201] (appeal taken
from Eng.) (UK).
292. Privacy Rights in the Digital Age, supra note 95, at 16, 31.
293. Id. at 7.
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United States should call to action the other four permanent members of
the Security Council in an effort to garner support as national security
leaders.
If regulation of FRT usage is instituted, the regulation would need to be
extremely strict, much like the national regulation suggested above. An
effective international agreement would need to be very specific and contain
no provisions justifying the technology’s use for any purpose outside of
the outlined scope, including national security. Additionally, the agreement
would need to take extra precaution in ensuring equity and protecting
individuals on the basis of race and gender.
Like state regulation, international regulation would need to include
accuracy standards; these must be globally uniform to protect against its
potential for human rights violations. Without a global accuracy standard
there is no accountability for the level of bias in the technology being used,
which could lead to even greater privacy violations and concerns. The bias
in the technology must be minimized to the greatest extent possible so as
not to further exclusion and oppression of marginalized populations. Global
accuracy standards would increase competition among FRT companies,
driving up need for accuracy and bias free technology even further.
With global accuracy standards comes global biometric data sharing.
Global data sharing is essential for increasing FRT accuracy. Diversity in
facial images used to train FRT algorithms is how the technology becomes
less biased.294 This data sharing could be problematic though if the regulation
is not sufficient to ensure the biometric data is obtained humanely. However,
the harm from unethical data gathering may be less than the harm from
inaccurate and biased FRT in use.
There would also need to be a third-party independent body in charge
of enforcement and acting as an umpire. This body would be needed to
test the accuracy of FRT, ensure it is being used according to the regulation,
and that any exception to the regulation is interpreted in the favor of human
rights. Disclosure of FRT usage and implementation to the third-party
group would also need to be required by the agreement to ensure enforcement
is possible and any violations would be observable and thus subject to sanction.
If disclosure of use was not required, privacy violations could continue and
go unpunished.
By proposing a short moratorium and regulation instead of a complete
ban on use, the international support may be increased. It would still be
very difficult to gain the support of the other members of the Security Council
though, as they are all using the technology. A moratorium may also be
difficult to enforce with the use of the technology shrouded in secrecy and

294.
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used to gain a competitive advantage on bad actors from different nations.
The strictness of the regulation may also prevent nations from being willing
to sign on or ratify regulation.
Additionally, international agreements may not hold the same weight
as they used to with shifting political climates in some of the major
global political players. The U.S.295 and UK296 have both pulled out of
international treaties and agreements in recent years, with the UK leaving
the EU and the U.S. leaving various international treaties under the Trump
administration.297 Although United States’ President Joe Biden has stated
he will rejoin international agreements during his presidency and has already
begun doing so,298 the previous Trump administration has cast a spotlight
on the fragility of international agreements when a powerful country
leaves or does not comply.
While an international moratorium and subsequent regulation is the
ideal solution, it does not seem likely this solution is feasible. There is still,
however, one potential solution to achieve the goal of equitable FRT use.
C. The Role of Companies
In recent years, private companies, specifically technology companies,
have been gaining autonomy in the sociopolitical sphere. Companies are
no longer just businesses, but rather social entities closely tied to national
politics. 299 When large and divisive events occur, companies are now
expected to take a stand, and failure to do so may put a company in bad

295. Zachary B. Wolf, Here are All the Treaties and Agreements Trump has Abandoned,
CNN (Feb. 1, 2019, 11:50 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2019/02/01/politics/nuclear-treatytrump/index.html [https://perma.cc/UT9G-FB8D].
296. Guidance Living in Europe, GOV.UK (last visited Sept. 9, 2021), https://www.
gov.uk/guidance/living-in-europe.
297. See Wolf, supra note 295.
298. Lindsay Maizland, Biden’s First Foreign Policy Move: Reentering International
Agreements, COUNCIL ON F OREIGN RELATIONS (Jan. 21, 2021), https://www.cfr.org/inbrief/bidens-first-foreign-policy-move-reentering-international-agreements [https://perma.cc/
E3W6-8TN7].
299. See Tiffany Hsu, Corporate Voices Get Behind ‘Black Lives Matter’ Cause,
N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/31/business/media/companies-marketingblack-lives-matter-george-floyd.html [https://perma.cc/56MA-4ULK]; see also Tiffany
Hsu & Davey Alba, Meta Makes Changes to Marketing Strategy Amid Scandals, N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 2, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/11/02/business/media/meta-adstrategy-facebook-scandal.html [https://perma.cc/R5C2-DS7L].
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light.300 Companies have been called on to take action and advocate for
human rights when the government cannot or will not.301
Although international law is not binding to companies specifically,
FRT companies across the globe must work together to create ethical
guidelines for FRT and promote human rights when nations cannot or will
not. Companies must take responsibility for their impact on human rights
violations.
Some FRT companies have already called for regulation and actively
want more regulation.302 Businesses have begun self-regulating the uses
of their technology and who or what agencies can use the technology, 303
but global cohesive action is necessary. Business morality should not place
companies at a competitive disadvantage. If FRT continues on unregulated,
it may develop to a point where it is far too dangerous to be implemented
and a ban may be necessary.
If public outcry grows regarding FRT use, businesses who have not
already suggested regulation will have no choice but to change course
in their implementation and increase awareness of where and how the tech
is used. While government and international regulation is necessary,
consumers and concerned citizens can also drive change. The motive for
a company to change course need not be internal. If enough public pressure
is mounted, companies may voluntarily impose self-regulation and increase
transparency.
VII. CONCLUSION
Facial recognition technology has been developed for the betterment of
society, but without proper regulation of the technology, there has been
and will continue to be grave consequences for the privacy of all individuals.
The populations most vulnerable to oppression are subject to greater risk
of this privacy intrusion and thus must have greater protections. A moratorium

300. This became evident during the 2020 Black Lives Matter protests. Companies
and businesses who did not voice support for the social justice and civil rights movement
were looked down upon. Id.
301. CEOs of social media companies were called on to block Donald Trump from
Twitter and other platforms after continuing to incite violence on the platforms after the
January 6, 2021 attack on the United States Capitol. See e.g., Kate Conger et. al., Twitter
and Facebook Lock Trump’s Accounts After Violence on Capitol Hill, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 6,
2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/06/technology/capitol-twitter-facebook-trump.html
[https://perma.cc/GQC3-NM28].
302. See e.g., Jeffrey Dastin, Amazon Extends Moratorium on Police use of Facial
Recognition Software, REUTERS (May 18, 2021), https://www.reuters.com/technology/
exclusive-amazon-extends-moratorium-police-use-facial-recognition-software-2021-0518/ [https://perma.cc/MD9K-TGUX].
303. See infra Section V.G.
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and regulation are necessary to ensure this technology does not completely
eliminate any existing right to privacy.
The rights of all individuals, regardless of race or gender, must be protected
from unlawful and unreasonable intrusion into individual privacy. More
must be done to protect all individuals against facial recognition technology.
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